Final Rules Amending TILA and Consumer Leasing Act

The Federal Reserve just adopted final rules pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). The rules increase the protections of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by extending TILA protections from transactions under $25,000 to those under $50,000. The $50,000 threshold will now fluctuate with the consumer price index, rather than remain static.

The rules also increase disclosure required by lessors of large consumer goods, such as cars, from $25,000 to $50,000. The required disclosures for leases more than four months include information to consumers about the cost of leases.

These rules are effective July 21, 2011.

- JSM

Does Unconscionability Theory Lead to Greater Economic Problems?

Today is the second day of the International Contracts Conference hosted this year by Stetson University College of Law. Professor Xi George Zhou of the University of Sheffield presented his paper, An Economic Perspective on Legal Remedies for Unconscionable Contracts, where he argues that there are disincentives to trade created by unconscionability doctrine, precaution problems and potential abuse of rights. His paper asks whether a higher deterrence model leads to greater economic problems. He proposes that creating an effective remedy for unconscionable behavior may require a legal remedy that is lower, as a high sanction may result in less economic transactions due to precautions employed by traders. Thus, it is impossible to eliminate bad behavior through deterrence alone. In order to use any legal mechanism we need to focus on the effectiveness of the tactic. There are risks to all deterrence models.

Professor Zhou also presented a call for papers for the Society of Legal Scholars Conference September 5-8. This year's topic is Law in Politics, Politics in Law. All papers on any aspect of contract, commercial and consumer law are welcome, whether on topic or not. Paper proposals are due by March 4, 2011 to Professor Zhou at qi.zhou@sheffield.ac.uk.

-jsm

Card Networks Attempting to Block Debit Card Merchant Fee Regulation

In a surprise late addition to the financial reform legislation, Congress required the Federal Reserve to regulate the fees that merchants pay to accept debit cards. The statute requires the regulated rate to include only per transaction costs and certain anti-fraud expenses. In December, the FED put out for comment a proposed rate of 12 cents per transaction, nearly 75% below the current average fee of 44 cents. Current rates are based on a percentage of the sale price.

Merchants were pleased with the FED's proposal. Banks were not, claiming that a fee that low would force them to lose money on debit card programs unless they charged their own customers. (Imagine that.) One bank has filed a constitutional challenge to the legislation, arguing that it constitutes a taking of bank property without just compensation and violates the equal protection clause because only the largest banks will have their rates regulated. The period for comment ends next Tuesday, February 22, and the FED must promulgate a final rate by April 21.

In recent testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, FED Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin explained that board members were "reserving judgment on the final rule" until they can consider all of the comments. Some lawmakers have expressed concern the FED has not adequately considered the cost of fraud prevention. Visa has ramped up a vigorous lobbying campaign, urging Congress to enact new legislation delaying the implementation of the regulation. Observers believe that changes at this point are unlikely. Representative Barney Frank, however, told the press that while he would not support the delay that Visa has requested, he would support instructing the FED to include more factors in the fee calculation.

2011 Sales Survey

I just put the draft of the Sales Survey up on SSRN. It will appear in the Business Lawyer in August or September, but there are some really great cases this year. Yes, some really good examination ideas as well!

- JSM

Suffolk Law Visiting Position

Suffolk University School of Law is seeking potential visiting professors (assistant, associate, or full) to teach a 6 credit-hour Contracts course beginning Fall 2011. Candidates should have significant teaching experience and strong student evaluations. Suffolk University is conveniently located in the center of Boston. If anyone is interested, please feel free to contact Elizabeth Trujillo, Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School, 120 Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108-4977 Tel: 617-305-1672; etrujillo@suffolk.edu.

- JSM

Specific Performance, Parol Evidence and the Naughty Monkey

Here is a great case about specific performance, parol evidence and a yacht named the "Naughty Monkey!"

U.C.C. section 2-716 provides a more liberal attitude toward the remedy of specific performance of contracts for the sale of goods than the common law traditionally does, and a concomitant broader view about when the goods are unique. In Naughty Monkey LLC v. Marinemax Northeast LLC, No. C.A. 5095-VCN, 2010 WL 5545409 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 2010, the court considered a request for specific performance based on language in a yacht sales contract providing “TRADE VALUE GUARANTEED TO 15% LOSS WITHIN 18 MONTHS (PER ANDREW SCHNEIDER) SUBJ. TO MARINE SURVEY AND FINANCING” (the “Buyer Protection Clause”). Michael Stock (“Stock”) contacted Marinemax Northeast LLC (“Marinemax”) about the purchase of a new boat after seeing their boats at the National Harbor Boat Show. Eventually, Stock purchased a 62-foot Azimut yacht, which he named the Naughty Monkey, for $1,825,000 through an entity he named the Naughty Monkey LLC (“Naughty Monkey”). Concerned about losses on a yacht of this price, Stock negotiated some down side price protection in the form of the Buyer Protection Clause. About a year later, Stock decided that he did not want the Naughty Monkey and proposed that he trade the boat back to Marinemax for a boat for $2900 and Marinemax would make a cash payment to him for $1,633.350, the difference under the contract. Marinemax refused this request, taking the position that the agreement only allowed Stock to trade the Naughty Monkey in toward the purchase of a more expensive yacht. Stock brought suit for specific performance on the contract, as well as damages related to financing, insurance and maintenance costs for the yacht.

The first issue the court considered was the meaning of the Buyer Protection Clause. Without any reference to section 2-202, the court instead initially referenced certain traditional notions of interpretation, namely to “effect to the clear terms of agreements, regardless of the intent of the parties at the time of contract formation” and to use the “customary, ordinary and accepted meaning of the language.” Nevertheless, the court considered extrinsic evidence to select a meaning of the Buyer Protection Clause that neither party argued: that Stock could trade in the Naughty Monkey to Marinemax, but not for cash, toward the purchase of any merchandise, not only boats of higher value.

Turning to the issue of specific performance under section 2-716, the court ruled that a “remedy at law would do complete injustice in this case.” The court observed that having Marinemax pay monetary damages would inevitably deprive it of the benefit of the bargain which would permit it to sell Stock another yacht at retail cost which it only paid wholesale. Similarly, if the court were to give Stock monetary relief then he would get a liquid asset, which is more than he would have received under the agreement. Accordingly, specific performance, was the appropriate remedy.

- JSM

Good Faith in the Termination of Sales Contracts

Courts in several cases addressed claims for breach of contract based on a party’s failure to act in good faith. So, what does good faith require under UCC section 1-304? In the following case, the court did a nice job of tying an arbitration panel's implication of a reasonability requirement in the application of a termination provision in an agreement with the obligation of good faith.

In Burton Corp. v. Shanghai Viquest Precesion Industries Co., Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 3163(DLC), 2010 WL 3024319 (S.D.N.Y. August 03, 2010), the court affirmed an arbitration award in favor of Shanghai Viquest Precesion Industries Co., Ltd. (“Viquest”) to recover for unpaid shipments of snowboard bindings made to Burton Corp. (“Burton”) for use in its snowboards and for wrongful termination of the sales agreement. The agreement permitted Burton to terminate if Viquest’s “financial position pose[d] a risk to Burton's business.” Additionally, the agreement provided that Viquest would, upon request, return Burton’s molds upon termination for any reason. During the term of the agreement and while Burton owed Viquest $1.8 million for unpaid shipments, Burton terminated, claiming financial concerns, and requested return of the molds.

When Viquest did not return the molds, Burton had to replace the molds and filed an arbitration to recover its cost of replacement as the agreement provided for arbitration of disputes. Viquest counterclaimed for its lost profits due to the early termination. The arbitration panel concluded that Burton could only terminate under the financial clause if it reasonably believed that Viquest’s financial position threatened its prospects, which Burton did not prove. Accordingly, the arbitration panel awarded Viquest its lost profits for the early termination and denied Burton’s request for the cost of replacing the molds as Burton was not itself in conformance with the agreement and owed Viquest substantial sums.

The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Burton’s request to vacate the arbitration award against it, confirming the award in full. The court treated the reasonableness as derived from the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, citing to the U.C.C. section 1-304 obligation of good faith contained in every contract. The court observed that the obligation of good faith required Burton to have a reasonable basis for terminating the agreement. Moreover, Burton’s failure to pay Viquest for outstanding invoices put pressure on Viquest’s financial condition.


- JSM